A ctlplne studio product

Issuer capability matrix

What this build can do with each certificate authority, per operation.

Served state: Served through the external-CA API and the same production server assembly tested below.

Read this before believing a "CA-agnostic" claim, including ours. Every row names the test that backs it, and the Protocol issuance proof column is separate from Issue on purpose: implementing an authority's API and having run an issuance against it are different statements, and only one of them is evidence.

This build has high-fidelity protocol issuance proof for 13 of 13 advertised authorities. Each proof starts a separate, nonce-bound authority-protocol substrate, drives the production server assembly through the provider-specific wire exchange, and independently verifies the returned certificate chain. That proves trstctl's adapter and custody path. It is not live vendor-account certification and does not prove a customer's policy, entitlement, network, appliance, or service version. Before production, run the same scoped issuance with your configured account.

Issuer Issue Protocol issuance proof Renew Revoke Unattended DV Key handling
adcs yes yes yes no no requester_csr
awspca yes yes yes yes no requester_csr
azurekv yes yes yes no no authority_generated
digicert yes yes yes yes yes requester_csr
ejbca yes yes yes yes no requester_csr
entrust yes yes yes no no requester_csr
gcpcas yes yes yes yes no requester_csr
globalsign yes yes yes no no requester_csr
letsencrypt yes yes yes yes yes requester_csr
sectigo yes yes yes yes yes requester_csr
smallstep yes yes yes yes no requester_csr
vaultpki yes yes yes yes no requester_csr
venafi yes yes yes yes no requester_csr

adcs

Backed by: internal/server: TestDODExternalCAUniversalProductionAssembly; internal/ca: TestRevokeMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestUnattendedDVMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestExternalCAHTTPDefaultsBlockSSRF

Protocol issuance proof: the universal DoD test drives this driver through its high-fidelity authority-protocol substrate and independently verifies the returned chain. This does not replace a scoped test against your real vendor account.

Revocation: Web Enrollment cannot revoke. Name a revocation_relay on the issuer and trstctl revokes through that domain-joined relay with certutil, publishes a new CRL and reads the revocation back; without one, revoke with certutil or the Certification Authority console.

Unattended domain validation: AD CS issues from template policy against a domain identity; there is no DCV challenge to solve.

awspca

Backed by: internal/server: TestDODExternalCAUniversalProductionAssembly; internal/ca: TestRevokeMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestUnattendedDVMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestExternalCAHTTPDefaultsBlockSSRF

Protocol issuance proof: the universal DoD test drives this driver through its high-fidelity authority-protocol substrate and independently verifies the returned chain. This does not replace a scoped test against your real vendor account.

Unattended domain validation: AWS Private CA is internal and performs no domain validation.

azurekv

Backed by: internal/server: TestDODExternalCAUniversalProductionAssembly; internal/ca: TestRevokeMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestUnattendedDVMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestExternalCAHTTPDefaultsBlockSSRF

Protocol issuance proof: the universal DoD test drives this driver through its high-fidelity authority-protocol substrate and independently verifies the returned chain. This does not replace a scoped test against your real vendor account.

Revocation: Azure Key Vault certificates are disabled rather than revoked, and trstctl does not drive that. Use the Azure portal or CLI.

Unattended domain validation: Azure Key Vault issues from its own policy with no domain-validation challenge trstctl drives.

digicert

Backed by: internal/server: TestDODExternalCAUniversalProductionAssembly; internal/ca: TestRevokeMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestUnattendedDVMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestExternalCAHTTPDefaultsBlockSSRF

Protocol issuance proof: the universal DoD test drives this driver through its high-fidelity authority-protocol substrate and independently verifies the returned chain. This does not replace a scoped test against your real vendor account.

ejbca

Backed by: internal/server: TestDODExternalCAUniversalProductionAssembly; internal/ca: TestRevokeMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestUnattendedDVMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestExternalCAHTTPDefaultsBlockSSRF

Protocol issuance proof: the universal DoD test drives this driver through its high-fidelity authority-protocol substrate and independently verifies the returned chain. This does not replace a scoped test against your real vendor account.

Unattended domain validation: EJBCA issues under its own certificate profile with no domain-validation challenge.

entrust

Backed by: internal/server: TestDODExternalCAUniversalProductionAssembly; internal/ca: TestRevokeMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestUnattendedDVMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestExternalCAHTTPDefaultsBlockSSRF

Protocol issuance proof: the universal DoD test drives this driver through its high-fidelity authority-protocol substrate and independently verifies the returned chain. This does not replace a scoped test against your real vendor account.

Revocation: No revocation implementation ships. Revoke from the Entrust console.

Unattended domain validation: Entrust validation is an organizational step outside trstctl.

gcpcas

Backed by: internal/server: TestDODExternalCAUniversalProductionAssembly; internal/ca: TestRevokeMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestUnattendedDVMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestExternalCAHTTPDefaultsBlockSSRF

Protocol issuance proof: the universal DoD test drives this driver through its high-fidelity authority-protocol substrate and independently verifies the returned chain. This does not replace a scoped test against your real vendor account.

Unattended domain validation: Google CAS is internal and performs no domain validation.

globalsign

Backed by: internal/server: TestDODExternalCAUniversalProductionAssembly; internal/ca: TestRevokeMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestUnattendedDVMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestExternalCAHTTPDefaultsBlockSSRF

Protocol issuance proof: the universal DoD test drives this driver through its high-fidelity authority-protocol substrate and independently verifies the returned chain. This does not replace a scoped test against your real vendor account.

Revocation: No revocation implementation ships. Revoke from the GlobalSign console.

Unattended domain validation: GlobalSign validation is an organizational step outside trstctl.

letsencrypt

Backed by: internal/server: TestDODExternalCAUniversalProductionAssembly; internal/ca: TestRevokeMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestUnattendedDVMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestExternalCAHTTPDefaultsBlockSSRF

Protocol issuance proof: the universal DoD test drives this driver through its high-fidelity authority-protocol substrate and independently verifies the returned chain. This does not replace a scoped test against your real vendor account.

sectigo

Backed by: internal/server: TestDODExternalCAUniversalProductionAssembly; internal/ca: TestRevokeMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestUnattendedDVMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestExternalCAHTTPDefaultsBlockSSRF

Protocol issuance proof: the universal DoD test drives this driver through its high-fidelity authority-protocol substrate and independently verifies the returned chain. This does not replace a scoped test against your real vendor account.

smallstep

Backed by: internal/server: TestDODExternalCAUniversalProductionAssembly; internal/ca: TestRevokeMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestUnattendedDVMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestExternalCAHTTPDefaultsBlockSSRF

Protocol issuance proof: the universal DoD test drives this driver through its high-fidelity authority-protocol substrate and independently verifies the returned chain. This does not replace a scoped test against your real vendor account.

Unattended domain validation: step-ca issues under provisioner policy; trstctl drives no ACME challenge against it.

vaultpki

Backed by: internal/server: TestDODExternalCAUniversalProductionAssembly; internal/ca: TestRevokeMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestUnattendedDVMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestExternalCAHTTPDefaultsBlockSSRF

Protocol issuance proof: the universal DoD test drives this driver through its high-fidelity authority-protocol substrate and independently verifies the returned chain. This does not replace a scoped test against your real vendor account.

Unattended domain validation: Vault PKI issues under its own role policy with no domain-validation challenge, so there is nothing to automate.

venafi

Backed by: internal/server: TestDODExternalCAUniversalProductionAssembly; internal/ca: TestRevokeMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestUnattendedDVMatrixMatchesTheImplementations, TestExternalCAHTTPDefaultsBlockSSRF

Protocol issuance proof: the universal DoD test drives this driver through its high-fidelity authority-protocol substrate and independently verifies the returned chain. This does not replace a scoped test against your real vendor account.

Unattended domain validation: Venafi issues against a policy folder the account is already scoped to; trstctl performs no domain validation.

Rendered live from github.com/ctlplne/trstctl — found a mistake? edit this page.